Parsing Pluralism: In Defense of Hopeful Realism 

Seminary students are warned against the dangers of “illegitimate totality transfer” (ITT) when interpreting the meaning of biblical texts from their original languages. ITT refers to the practice of attributing all possible meanings of a word to its use in a particular setting, without reference to important contextual and grammatical clues that narrow down the options. In other words, it means treating any particular use of a word as importing an entire lexicon entry along with it—making meaning far more flexible and less precise. (Treating the Hebrew “ruach,” which can mean wind, spirit, or breath, as if it always means all three equally would be just this sort of an error.) Of course, there generally are important cues to help render meaning more precisely. While doing so means working harder and sometimes attending to technical details, it would be irresponsible to neglect this work.  

As in biblical interpretation, so also in political theory and theology we must address interpretive details in order to be clear and precise. Several recent critical reviews of Hopeful Realism: Evangelical Natural Law and Democratic Politics (which I wrote with Bryan McGraw and Micah Watson)—particularly those sympathetic to postliberal commitments—have raised questions about the role of “pluralism” in our vision for a renewed evangelical political theory. But which sort of pluralism?  

A few examples illustrate the issue. Joshua Herring describes Hopeful Realism as “squishy” because it uncritically asserts that “pluralism is an inherent good,” “that the American liberal regime is compatible with Christianity and [that] … pluralistic democracy is ideal.” For Herring, the central problem is “the authors’ inability to uphold the moral convictions of natural law theory and apply those convictions to the political sphere.” Likewise, William H. Rooney states that Hopeful Realism “treats the contingent error of contemporary ethical pluralism as an ontological necessity and thus recommends compromising universal moral precepts to protect political ‘pluriformity.’” He goes on to suggest that our emphasis on humility and restraint results in “a consistent deference to contemporary pluralism even when universal moral standards are at stake.” James Wood concurs, suggesting that Hopeful Realism’s “defense of pluralism is simply far too strong.” He describes the book as “uncharitable” and dismissive toward “those who would challenge their particular emphasis on pluralism and religious liberty and would contest the idea of public neutrality on moral and religious issues.” Similarly, Brad Littlejohn (responding to our essay rather than the book) fears we do postliberal arguments an injustice by moving from a description of plurality to a prescription of pluralism. He describes the concept of “Hopeful Realism” as vulnerable to two critiques: 1) the extent to which liberal democracy as we describe it relates to the vacuous, autonomy-glorifying philosophical liberalism we see around us, and 2) the religious vision necessary to orient a society (“no politics can be religiously neutral, and a Christian politics must actively promote Christian faith and practice”). Littlejohn sees “slippage” here—more precisely, a “leap from the fact that religious differences cannot be eradicated this side of the eschaton (which is incontestable) to the assertion that this plurality is a ‘key political good’.” 

In short, Herring, Rooney, Wood, and Littlejohn see an uncritical acceptance of pluralism as undermining the substantive moral claims of the natural law in our framework, neglecting both moral and religious truth. Moreover, their arguments suggest the potential for conflating religious and moral pluralism. Is pluralism always good or always bad? These concerns about pluralism’s place in Hopeful Realism revolve around the relationship between the descriptive and the normative—what is versus what ought to be—and especially the relationship of Hopeful Realism to liberal democracy’s putative philosophical commitment to neutrality (both moral and religious). Insofar as these critiques turn in part on ambiguity about the concept of pluralism, this concept warrants some careful attention. We welcome this opportunity for further reflection in this area and here clarify how far removed Hopeful Realism is from philosophical liberalism, showing how it has something critical to offer those tempted by postliberal perspectives that may treat all pluralisms as equally suspect. 

Several Reformed thinkers, including David Koyzis (in Political Visions and Illusions) and Richard Mouw (in Pluralisms and Horizons, with Sander Griffioen), have helped clarify important theological distinctions among different types of pluralism. Accounting for these briefly:  

“Structural pluralism” refers to the diverse (pluriform) structures like families, businesses, schools, etc., which, by God’s creational design, compose society. As part of creation’s good design, these have distinct responsibilities. Collapsing these is a moral wrong and thus protecting them is an important good. 

“Cultural pluralism” describes the myriad and diverse ways that finite creatures go about fulfilling the Creation Mandate—including culturally distinct food, music, architecture, language, traditions, etc. These are a good part of human culture-making that government should protect.  

“Empirical pluralism” (including “moral pluralism”) accounts for the contingent descriptive reality of deep difference in humans’ beliefs and commitments. This reality is not inherently good; holding otherwise would require an indefensible relativism.  

“Confessional Pluralism” draws on the legacy of Abraham Kuyper in holding that the state lacks the capacity to rightly judge which specific church is sufficiently right so as to warrant placing the state’s coercive power behind it. It highlights the limits on the state’s competence in religious matters and the eschatological “not yet” of religious unity.

Recognizing that there is much more to say about each of these, a few observations are in order. First, Hopeful Realism takes aim at the limits of empirical pluralism as regards morality. That is, HR challenges any account of liberalism that suggests moral neutrality is inherently good or necessary. Given the sort of beings humans are, we can in fact make rational claims about what is good for us. Thus construed, HR stands opposed to philosophies of liberal democracy that claim otherwise (like John Rawls’s account in Political Liberalism). Indeed, our argument should make a philosophical liberal, committed to ethical neutrality, quite uncomfortable. We don’t believe, though, that the coercive power of the state should then just be employed to eradicate moral pluralism. Inside of time, empirical pluralism is a permanent feature of every political community. That means that while we do think that the created order offers meaningful guidance for politics’ role in securing real human goods, these must be applied in ways that recognize the limits of power, the good of responsible human agency, and our place in redemptive history. But contrary to what some of our critics have said, a key contention of the book is that politics can act to mitigate moral evils and pursue moral goods.

Second, HR remains committed to protecting confessional pluralism, distinguishing between creational structures of natural law and directional relationship to God (confessional issues pertain to the latter). Here, the state has a moral duty not to over-extend and presume that it has the data of judgment for supporting one specific church. We don’t describe this as the state’s being “neutral” toward religion so much as that the state’s area of responsibility focuses on creational structures rather than redemptive direction. Of course, there are meaningful boundary issues to be worked out—particularly when moral and religious commitments intersect. Moreover, this vision for the state is no less theological by virtue of being contingent on our place in redemptive history. Our context in the saeculum (no longer the Israel of the Old Covenant and not yet the post-eschaton New Jerusalem) means we should not conflate the political and worshipping communities. Until Christ returns, the political community will never be coterminous with the covenant community. Acting to the contrary mistakes our location in redemptive history and misconstrues the responsibilities of the state.

Third, the creational goodness of structural pluralism and cultural pluralism provides important grounds for limiting the power of the state. Governments should not overpower other good spheres of society as they discharge their responsibilities before God, nor should they unjustly constrain cultural differences. Combined with confessional pluralism, there is a good basis for a type of liberal democracy that protects these spheres and their development, even as it rejects the purported neutrality of some liberal philosophers.

Fourth, what we present in Hopeful Realism seeks to reconcile each type of pluralism to the others. The moral truths of the natural law do guide the ends of government, but in a manner that honors the moral responsibilities of the individual and other social structures, and is appropriately wary of centralized power. Our principled commitment to democracy and decentralization reflects that wariness, while allowing for more expansive governance in local communities. Faithfully honoring multiple goods in this way means being politically less ambitious than postliberals are nationally and more so than liberals are locally.

Contrary to some critical readers, the liberal democracy that Hopeful Realism can affirm is far from neutral. Even after distinguishing confessional pluralism, the realities of moral plurality result in a state of tension. Moral difference can neither be totalized (as with the relativism of Rawls’ “reasonable” pluralism) nor overcome (via over-optimistic moral absolutisms). The former deny the creational realities of the natural law; the latter fail to account for the effects of sin on epistemology and agreement, and/or are content to set aside important goods of humans’ rational and moral agency. As described in Hopeful Realism, inside of time this tension is only resolved (imperfectly) on a sliding scale, where larger political bodies address fewer and more stark issues, while more fine-grained moral judgments can be made at lower levels of government. Critiques that describe this as “neutral,” “squishy,” or “slippage” seem to conflate distinct pluralisms, missing important distinctions upon which our argument relies.

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