Just Statecraft and the Problem of “Peace”: A Response

Some Christian thinkers are seizing on the Trump administration’s efforts to force an end to the war in Ukraine as evidence of just war theory in action. For instance, noting that the just war tradition “requires us to determine just cause, but it also asks us to ponder the probability of success,” R. R. Reno in an essay in First Things applauds President Donald Trump because he has “determined that the Ukrainians cannot defeat Russia’s army” and “is pursuing the normal means by which inconclusive conflicts are resolved: negotiated compromise.” Similarly, at Providence, Tim Milosch argues that the administration’s “handling of the Ukraine war, despite the messy Oval Office moment (and it was only a moment), is more aligned with the finer points of just war theory and Christian realism than many are willing to consider.” (According to the author, we are two of those “many.”)     

These approaches to Russia’s genocidal war on Ukraine and applications of just war thinking seem to miss the mark—especially as we wrestle with trying to find the best pathway to a just and durable peace.

Milosch takes us to task for our pessimistic view of Trump, arguing—somewhat bizarrely—that Trump’s position is “more aligned” with just war thinking than we might concede. He attempts to use just war moral reasoning to buttress his position—a position that sidesteps the chief moral criteria of the just war tradition itself. At bottom, just war thinking has as its goal a justly ordered peace, not peace as soon as possible or peace at any price. By ignoring the fact that Trump has been clearly tilting toward Putin, and in wrongly asserting that we in the West have adopted a “moralizing posture” that is “ahistorical,” Milosch seems to ignore the truth of the present and the past.

In addition, his essay fails to deal with the issues at hand—whether this concerns Trump’s shamefully uneven approach to the two belligerents, his actual convictions, the absence of any awareness of the history of the conflict, or the absence of any examination of the present world disorder, which Trump in his short presidency has dramatically exacerbated. And what about the European fallout that followed Trump’s performance in recent weeks? “Just statecraft” cannot fail to confront these most basic challenges and impediments.

Milosch allows that the “justness of the Ukrainian cause is beyond dispute. Russia is clearly the aggressor, is clearly violating international law, and undoubtedly shoulders the blame.” It’s worth pointing out that Trump and some in his administration do not seem to share that commonsense view, which raises questions about whether Trump is the right person to “attempt to kick-start peace talks on Ukraine” (in the author’s words). The pressure to engage in “dialogue” and peace negotiations—as if a moral symmetry between Russia and Ukraine exists—is utterly flawed, as Vladimir Putin’s own public statements about Ukraine’s identity and future clearly demonstrate.

We do not argue against such talks in principle, or against a negotiated end to hostilities. Ukraine’s willingness to accept a ceasefire is an indication that Kiev wants peace. But the Ukrainians, who have suffered hell for over three years due to a terrorist regime, understandably want a just, enforceable, and durable peace. That’s why we argue against any so-called “peace” that makes demands of one side but not the other, that imposes upon and extracts from Ukraine but not from Russia, that leaves the victim defenseless and the aggressor emboldened, and that only delays the aggressor’s plans. Previous essays by us point back to Munich for that very reason.

And, respectfully, the “messy Oval Office moment” was not “only a moment.” Whether we start with the Trump administration’s words and deeds since January 20, 2025—or whether we begin the tally in 2019, when Trump demanded that Zelensky investigate Trump’s political opponents—Trump has consistently bullied Zelensky and shown a preference for Putin’s Russia over Zelensky’s Ukraine.  

Wise and just statesmanship would help steer this war to a cessation by providing the security guarantees that Ukraine needs, and by making clear to Russia that Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty will be defended. In his current approach, Trump is not playing the role of a wise statesman, nor is he being guided by just war thinking.

Second Thoughts

All of this leads us to second thoughts on the essay in First Things. Not unlike Milosch, Reno cites the just war tradition and, specifically, the condition of likelihood of success, to applaud the Trump gambit. 

As evidence, he states that it may be “gallant,” but it surely is not “Christian moral judgment,” that leads a nation to fight a losing battle—thus suggesting that Trump is helping extricate Ukraine from flawed moral judgment and this losing battle.

But who defines a losing battle or “lost cause”? Were the American colonies embroiled in a losing battle as they fought what was then the most powerful of world empires? Was Britain fighting a losing battle as it faced Hitler’s Germany alone in 1940? Was President Truman as he defiantly sustained—and refused to abandon—West Berlin? Were the South Koreans and Americans when they were cornered on the Pusan Perimeter? And, in the end, what costs are morally justified? The answer defies any sort of calculus, for it depends on the nature of the evil needing to be countered or deterred. Quite simply, there exist human goods of such great value that high costs must be paid in order to defend them.

“A wise leader,” Reno instructs us, “does not embark on unrealistic enterprises, especially when lives are at stake.” Further, and to the supposed credit of the new U.S. administration, we read that Trump “has determined that the Ukrainians cannot defeat Russia’s army”; therefore, Trump is pursuing “the normal means by which inconclusive conflicts are resolved: negotiated compromise.” Strangely, and much like the Providence essay, this piece adduces the “just war” tradition but seems oblivious to the tradition’s bottom line of a just peace. 

Coming to the Peace Table

On social media, Trump posted recently: “To Russia and Ukraine, get to the table right now, before it is too late.” This demand accords with the president’s denial of Ukraine’s innocence and his unwillingness to acknowledge the truth of Putin’s outrageous actions over the last decade and a half and the injustice of the formal conflict beginning in February 2022. “The fighting has to stop,” Trump declared. “Both sides need to get to the table.” Again, note the moral equivalence, not moral reality.

Reno concludes with what he argues to be “the moral principles of just war,” and specifically, according to this understanding, the “likelihood of success” factor in calculating whether war is prudent or not. Trump, according to such thinking, “is acknowledging reality and taking steps necessary to put an end to a war that cannot be won.” But a nagging question remains—one that neither Reno nor Milosch seems to address: Is this a war that, on Ukraine’s part, is wholly just and therefore needs to be fought? It is difficult for the reader, at this point, not to reflect on the lead-up to World War II.     

In sum, there is precious little in these discussions that mirrors just war moral reasoning. Absent is any examination of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, discrimination, or proportionality, much less of their application to Russia’s unjust invasion of an independent and sovereign nation. Neither do we find any acknowledgment of an enduring atrocity that has been ongoing for three years, nor any discussion of what will happen around the globe if Putin is rewarded for his actions.

Let us apply this line of reasoning to Nazi Germany in 1938 and 1939. Perhaps, according to such thinking, “the moral principles of just war” should have prevented a “world war.” Perhaps, as with Austria, then Czechoslovakia, then Poland, and then the Low Countries, the Allies should have acknowledged that defying Hitler was a losing, fruitless battle. 

Why do Ukrainians themselves not want a “peace at any price”? The answer is not difficult to understand. They know, as the Czechs sensed in 1938, that it will not be a justly ordered peace; it will be illicit and deceitful, as time will tragically demonstrate.

What will Trump’s “just war” defenders write after Putin’s next war? Make no mistake: if Putin is rewarded for his aggression against Ukraine, there will be a next war. He and his regime covet the Baltics, declare that eastern Poland was a gift from Stalin that should be taken back, and envision a remade Russian Empire. 

Peace: Not at Any Price

What the just war tradition requires is not a mere “likelihood of success” condition. Rather, it demands a justly ordered peace. Were the secondary element of “likelihood of success” in fact primary, then Churchill, acting as a lone voice in the wilderness, would have been a fool. Perhaps we should not have gone against all odds in fighting the Nazi imperial vision for Europe. Perhaps we should not oppose a wholly unjust invasion of a sovereign, independent nation like Ukraine. Perhaps might really does—and should—make right. Perhaps the U.S. should not be called upon to be a force for good in the world. And perhaps the Good Samaritan should never intervene when and where gross injustice is encountered.

Policy, as John Courtney Murray reminded us three generations ago, is the meeting place of the world of power and the world of morality. And indeed, this is what just war moral reasoning—properly understood—requires. At its heart, just war thinking aims to furnish a justly ordered peace—not a peace at any price, not a mere cessation of conflict that refuses to address the root cause of that unjust conflict, and not a mere absence of conflict.

George Weigel has stated it well: “As a tradition of statecraft, the just war tradition recognizes that there are circumstances in which the first and most urgent obligation in the face of evil is to stop it.” Such are the circumstances of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Which is why murderous tyrants like Vladimir Putin must be stopped, resisted, or at least not abetted in their aims, far less be permitted to establish “ceasefire” conditions in a wholly unjust war they have started.

Image by Александр Микрюков and licensed via Adobe Stock.