On Monasteries and Birth Rates 

Something is clearly amiss in our society. There is an epidemic of suicide, anxiety, and loneliness. Fertility and marriage rates are also declining—trends social conservatives interpret as both a cause and a symptom of our broader social malaise.  

The discussion of our current demographic trends, however, has focused largely on economic and cultural explanations. See, for example, the discussion of real income among the lower and middle classes and the rise of the gig economy. Others point to cultural explanations such as the rise of intensive parenting or a distorted ethos of individualism. When religion is mentioned, it’s presented exclusively as a cultural force that shapes people’s values. These conversations are vital, since economics and culture are enormously important.  

Yet social institutions are also important, and we’ve collectively failed to acknowledge their role in renewing our society. Social institutions support families at both an ecological and an individual level. Thus, any discussion on creating a society supportive of family life must consider the state of our institutions.  

Social Institutions in Western Demographic History—the Role of Monasteries 

Because we are so acclimated to our own society, however, we can often miss all the ways that social institutions—or their absence—shape our demographic behavior. Stepping outside of our spheres of influence to look at our demographic heritage in the West can illustrate how institutions matter. 

Like all demographic patterns, the fertility system in historical Europe was the result of a complex interplay between economics, culture, and institutions. Cultural values dictated that people waited until marriage to have children, and that marriageability was tied to one’s ability to support a family. In combination with norms concerning inheritance and the existence of a largely agricultural economy, this often meant waiting to inherit land before starting a family. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in a comparatively late age at marriage. Where other natural fertility societies often had an average age at marriage in the mid-to-late teens, Europe generally had average ages in the mid-to-late twenties, for both men and women. The European system also left significant proportions of people never having children at all. Despite widespread childlessness, high rates of fertility within marriage maintained a moderate fertility rate in the population.  

Within this historical regime shaped by culture and economics, social institutions also played an important role. Monasteries, in particular, served important functions in the demographic ecology. Monasteries absorbed excess children; impoverished parents could safely abandon children they couldn’t care for, and people of all social classes gave children as oblates to avoid dividing the family estate among “too many” offspring. With their members’ vows of chastity, monasteries regulated fertility rates by sequestering part of the population from reproduction. Monasteries also provided social goods such as education for the poor, hospitals for the sick, and relief for the impoverished.  

Monasteries therefore teach us two important lessons for our current cultural moment. First, institutions are an important part of our demographic ecologies, even when their purpose is not demographic. Secondly, being unmarried and childless need not be synonymous with an individualistic lifestyle. Indeed, social institutions are a powerful force for channeling the talents of their participants outward toward the broader community. In this way, social institutions can be inherently pro-family. 

Social Institutions Benefit Families Because We Are “Cooperative Breeders” 

Social institutions can foster an ecology supportive of family life because humans are what the anthropological literature calls “cooperative breeders.” Compared to other primates, humans have long periods of juvenile dependence and short birth intervals. This places a high care burden on human mothers. From an evolutionary perspective, humans have overcome this by receiving help from non-parents. Evolutionary biologist Karen Kramer describes this cooperative trait in contemporary societies, saying “assistance in raising young, which traditionally came from kin and others, is today augmented by governments and institutions” (emphasis mine).  

Yet our social institutions have withered. Earlier centuries had monasteries, and the twentieth century had fraternal organizations, but so far, the twenty-first century has no equivalent. The current lack of vibrant social institutions therefore leaves people only with government programs and their individual social networks. For individuals who have the social capital to create rich social networks (or the wealth to buy substitutes in the labor market), the decline of social institutions hasn’t been disastrous. Even for these “socially rich,” however, social networks take more individual effort to create and maintain than the communities created by social institutions. For those who are less adept at creating their own social networks, the decline of communities that exist independent of one’s individual effort has been devastating. 

Thus, when social institutions wither, family life becomes more difficult. Political Scientist Robert Putnam, perhaps best known for documenting the deterioration of American social institutions in his book Bowling Alone, also documents their flourishing in his book The Upswing. There, he demonstrates that America’s marriage and baby boom coincided with a flourishing in American social associations. Once pointed out, this seems obvious; the institution of the family thrived when other supportive social institutions did.  

Religion provides a practical example of how this works. Scholarly research has shown that the communities surrounding religious practice play a key role in linking religious participation to higher fertility rates. Despite different theological teachings across Christianity, Judaism and Islam, more religious people across these diverse religions consistently have higher fertility. Religious services create place-based communities, and religious people therefore tend to have more social support. This network of community support ameliorates some of the demands of childcare which, in turn, supports higher fertility. A study of Muslim women in the Gambia, for example, found that more religious women received more childcare help. The children of these more religious mothers received more care despite their mothers’ investing less in them. With better cared-for children from less effort, more religious women had more children than their less religious and less supported counterparts. That is, as “cooperative breeders” we do better in communities. In this way, religion as a social institution—distinct from religion as a cultural force—supports family life.

Social Institutions Help Individuals Develop Communal Virtues 

Social institutions also have beneficial effects for those who participate in them. At an individual level, social institutions are pro-family because participating in them strengthens similar social skills that are necessary for family life. Inherent in their structure, both family and social institutions demand that members accommodate others and make compromises; they both provide opportunities to unequally give and receive. Both can provide companionship, solidarity, and meaning. It is because of these similarities that many social associations use familial language such as “fraternal organization” and have familial names such as “Big Brothers Big Sisters” and the “Catholic Daughters of America.”  

Participating in social institutions is therefore particularly beneficial for those living outside of families. In our current society, even people who form their own families often spend years outside of family life. I, personally, spent thirteen years between moving out of my parent’s home and getting married to form my own family. Social institutions provide an environment to practice the communal virtues while living outside a family. 

The participation of single people in social institutions therefore also has beneficial effects on cultural norms. The more people participate in social institutions, the more culturally normative participation becomes. This works to break the current assumption that single life is a life centered on the self, and that opting out of family life is a ticket to self-oriented individualism. Plenty of virtuous individuals orient their lives outward in all seasons of life, yet our social norms ought to affirm that the good life—regardless of marital status—is oriented outward. Institutions can help constructively channel this posture.  

It is therefore imperative that we revive social institutions. Social conservatives have long recognized the civilizational value of the quotidian work of parenthood. In an analogous way, we ought to recognize that it is in the small acts of local participation that societies thrive or languish. Even seemingly small things such as participating in a neighborhood sports team or volunteering at the church picnic will help rebuild a social ecology that is outward-facing and therefore life-giving. The bad news is that this work cannot be accomplished with a one-time policy lever from Washington. The good news is that everyone can play a part. 

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