http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2009/10/990 Mon, 06 Feb 2012 01:32:57 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.5 hourly 1 http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2009/10/990/comment-page-1#comment-4985 Keynesianism, Social Services, and Solvency « Public Discourse Mon, 19 Sep 2011 01:30:14 +0000 http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/?p=990#comment-4985 [...] Both the intervention and incentive symmetry principles apply in the case of health insurance (and for most other services provided by social programs), and they need to be taken into account by those struggling to lower costs while providing private goods. First, imagine the consequences of a hypothetical world where everyone is desperately interested in buying health insurance. Those who can afford to do so make the purchase. Those who cannot afford the purchase are invited to self-identify by visiting the government window and explaining their circumstances. If they qualify, they are granted cash. (We already know that the individual wants insurance because the motivation to buy insurance can be made as strong as we want as explained in the next paragraph.) So, without loss of generality, we may assume that the cash is applied toward insurance purchase. The necessary group self-identifies, so lack of information (i.e., inability to identify the group in need) is no longer an impediment. Ineffective in-kind programs are no longer needed, because outlays are granted in cash form and incentives satisfy the intervention principle. Relative to a broad-based entitlement program, expenses are low because they are targeted. [...] [...] Both the intervention and incentive symmetry principles apply in the case of health insurance (and for most other services provided by social programs), and they need to be taken into account by those struggling to lower costs while providing private goods. First, imagine the consequences of a hypothetical world where everyone is desperately interested in buying health insurance. Those who can afford to do so make the purchase. Those who cannot afford the purchase are invited to self-identify by visiting the government window and explaining their circumstances. If they qualify, they are granted cash. (We already know that the individual wants insurance because the motivation to buy insurance can be made as strong as we want as explained in the next paragraph.) So, without loss of generality, we may assume that the cash is applied toward insurance purchase. The necessary group self-identifies, so lack of information (i.e., inability to identify the group in need) is no longer an impediment. Ineffective in-kind programs are no longer needed, because outlays are granted in cash form and incentives satisfy the intervention principle. Relative to a broad-based entitlement program, expenses are low because they are targeted. [...]

]]> http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2009/10/990/comment-page-1#comment-85 Health Care for Us All – Justin Taylor Tue, 27 Oct 2009 11:43:28 +0000 http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/?p=990#comment-85 [...] at Public Discourse Professor Grinols writes: Imagine that every American has good health insurance, appropriate to his [...] [...] at Public Discourse Professor Grinols writes: Imagine that every American has good health insurance, appropriate to his [...]

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